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Abstract
Animal cognition research aims to understand animal minds by using a diverse range of
methods across an equally diverse range of species. Throughout its history, the field has
sought to mitigate various biases that occur when studying animal minds, from experimenter
effects to anthropomorphism. Recently, there has also been a focus on how common scien-
tific practices might affect the reliability and validity of published research. Usually, these
issues are discussed in the literature by a small group of scholars with a specific interest in
the topics. This study aimed to survey a wider range of animal cognition researchers to ask
about their attitudes towards classic and contemporary issues facing the field. Two-hundred
and ten active animal cognition researchers completed our survey, and provided answers
on questions relating to bias, replicability, statistics, publication, and belief in animal cogni-
tion. Collectively, researchers were wary of bias in the research field, but less so in their own
work. Over 70% of researchers endorsed Morgan’s canon as a useful principle but many
caveated this in their free-text responses. Researchers self-reported that most of their stud-
ies had been published, however they often reported that studies went unpublished because
they had negative or inconclusive results, or results that questioned “preferred” theories.
Researchers rarely reported having performed questionable research practices themselves
—however they thought that other researchers sometimes (52.7% of responses) or often
(27.9% of responses) perform them. Researchers near unanimously agreed that replication
studies are important but too infrequently performed in animal cognition research, 73.0% of
respondents suggested areas of animal cognition research could experience a ‘replication
crisis’ if replication studies were performed. Consistently, participants’ free-text responses
provided a nuanced picture of the challenges animal cognition research faces, which are
available as part of an open dataset. However, many researchers appeared concerned with
how to interpret negative results, publication bias, theoretical bias and reliability in areas of
animal cognition research. Collectively, these data provide a candid overview of barriers to
progress in animal cognition and can inform debates on how individual researchers, as well
as organizations and journals, can facilitate robust scientific research in animal cognition.
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Introduction
Animal cognition research covers a wide range of topics, from how animals learn and remem-
ber to how they make decisions and how they interact with other individuals. By studying a
wide number of questions in an equally wide range of species, the field broadly aims to under-
stand the mechanisms, functions and the evolution of cognition (although exact definitions
depended on context, for example see [1–3] for ‘comparative cognition’ and for ‘comparative
psychology’ see [4,5]). However, studying animal minds—that are in principle unobservable—
is challenging [6,7], and the process is shaped by a variety of assumptions about minds, ani-
mals, and knowledge [8], as well as the history of the field itself. Notably, throughout this his-
tory, animal cognition researchers have often sought to improve how we study animal
cognition. They foregrounded debates on experimenter bias [9,10], parsimony [11], and eco-
logical validity [12], and the importance of a wide range of anecdotal [13,14], observational
[15] and experimental data [16,17]. However, whether the field has vastly improved its meth-
ods along these lines is debated. Concerns about experimenter bias [18,19], parsimony [20,21],
and validity [22–25] still dominate the literature today, and concerns have also been raised
about the reliability of the statistical effects that are reported in the animal cognition literature
[26–28].
The extent to which some areas of animal cognition are making progress is hotly debated
[29–39]. However, these debates are often performed by a minority of stakeholders in animal
cognition research—often between those who claim discoveries of “higher” processes in ani-
mals and their corresponding ‘killjoys’ or skeptics, accompanied by a meta-commentary from
a small number of interested researchers and philosophers. But how effectively these debates
are reaching animal cognition researchers in general, and how they are received, has garnered
little attention. Survey studies can address this by directly asking researchers their opinions on
key debates in the field, how their own research practices are shaped by these debates, and
what they feel is incentivised in academia. For example, survey studies have quantified the neg-
ative effects on researchers’ mental health due to academia’s “publish or perish” culture [40],
and researchers often report that scientific incentives are misaligned with their scientific ideals.
For example, ecology researchers reported that while they thought replication studies were a
crucial use of resources, they experienced difficulty obtaining funding for them and, even if
they were performed, they perceived barriers to publishing them [41]. More directly, research-
ers have self-reported using false-positive inflating research practices at non-negligible rates
[42–44], and also measured editor and reviewer biases against replication studies [45,46].
In the current study, we surveyed researchers’ attitudes towards several contentious topics
in animal cognition research and examined how their own and others’ research methods
might be affected by these debates and wider scientific incentives. Thus, the survey was
designed to, i) survey the extent to which researchers are concerned about certain research
and publication practices in the field, ii) collect direct evidence of the rates of these practices
from researchers themselves, practices that may otherwise be difficult to observe, and iii) pro-
vide researchers with the opportunity to voice any concerns or opinions they have about how
animal cognition research operates. These data may impact the field in three ways. Firstly, they
can help researchers critically evaluate the evidential strength of published findings, given how
frequently researchers estimate certain biases to be present. Secondly, they can facilitate
debates on the effectiveness of the scientific process in animal cognition and engage research-
ers and students in these debates. Finally, they can help to identify barriers to effective scien-
tific research of animal cognition that can inform policy making in journals, funding bodies
and hiring committees, as well as decision making by individual animal cognition researchers.
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We invited 1001 researchers who have published in animal cognition journals in the
last three years to answer a range of questions about bias and research practices in ani-
mal cognition research. The survey consisted of five blocks of questions, broadly cover-
ing, i) bias, ii) publication practices, iii) statistics, iv) replication, and v) how researchers
derive their own beliefs about animal cognition. These five blocks were not mutually
exclusive (e.g., answers about “bias” featured throughout), but were loosely based on
some of the key challenges facing animal cognition research, and science more broadly
[1,7,47–49].
The full survey is presented in the Methods section, but briefly, the five blocks covered top-
ics as follows. The Bias block asked researchers about experimenter bias and objectivity in
their own work, and about the role bias might play in shaping the results and theories in ani-
mal cognition research more broadly. The final topic of the bias block was Morgan’s canon—
the notion that animal behaviour should not be interpreted in terms of “higher” psychological
processes if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of “lower” processes—with researchers answer-
ing whether they agreed that “Morgan’s canon is important to use when interpreting the
results of animal cognition research”. The Publication block first asked to what extent
researchers thought that they themselves, and other researchers, make appropriate claims
when submitting research for publication. Second, as a direct measure of publication bias, we
asked researchers which proportion of their own studies has been published, or will be pub-
lished for ongoing studies, as well as the reasons why some of their studies go unpublished.
The Statistics block then measured researchers’ confidence in their own statistical analyses,
and their ability to judge the validity of other analyses. Next, it asked researchers to estimate
the prevalence of “questionable research practices”, which may increase the likelihood of spuri-
ous findings in their own and in others’ research. The Replication block first focused on atti-
tudes towards replication studies; how important are replications, and are replications
performed often enough in their own area of research and others? Second, it asked researchers
about whether they believe their own area of research, or other areas of research in animal cog-
nition, would experience a ‘replication crisis’ if multiple replication studies were attempted,
and how many of these replication studies they would predict to be ‘successful’. Finally, the
Belief block asked researchers a range of questions about how they decide what to believe
about animals’ cognition. We asked researchers about the role that scientific experiments and
day-to-day experience play in shaping these beliefs, as well as how often they agree with the
conclusions presented in scientific papers.
Materials and methods
We invited all researchers who are a first, last or corresponding author on any type of article
published in the past three years (i.e., 2018–2020 inclusive) from the following six animal cog-
nition journals to complete our survey: Animal Cognition, Animal Behavior and Cognition,
Journal of Comparative Psychology, International Journal of Comparative Psychology, Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition, Frontiers in Psychology: Compara-
tive Psychology. BGF viewed every article from these journals between 2018 and 2020, and
extracted the email addresses of the first, last and corresponding authors. If these email
addresses were not provided in the article, BGF conducted a keyword-based web search to try
to find one for the author in question. In total, 1161 authors were identified and email
addresses for 1004 of these could be located from the articles or web searches. Of these, three
email addresses were our own, leaving a final sample of 1001. Emails were sent to these 1001
researchers in January 2021. Sixty-four emails returned errors, and BGF conducted further
web searchers to identity alternative emails for these researchers, of which 32 were obtained
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and the survey invite emailed to. Of the 969 successfully sent emails, 210 completed surveys
were returned (response rate = 21.6%).
Researchers completed a questionnaire hosted on Qualtrics. The study protocol was
approved by the University of Cambridge’s Psychology Research Ethics Committee
(PRE.2020.096). The survey was designed by BGF, with feedback from NSC and LO, and then
piloted on several volunteers from the Comparative Cognition Laboratory at the University of
Cambridge. The full survey is detailed below, and the anonymized survey data and analysis
code are available at osf.io/6j7kp.
Demographics
Participants gave informed consent and answered the following demographic questions:
1. On approximately how many papers have you been an author or co-author about animal
learning, cognition, behavior or welfare?
2. Approximately how many years have you worked in animal learning, cognition, behavior
or welfare?
3. How well do each of these terms describe your research? (Not at all, Slightly, Moderately,
Very, Extremely)
Animal behavior, animal cognition, animal learning, behavioral ecology, behavioural neuro-
science, comparative psychology
4. In which of these journals have you authored or co-authored a paper?
Animal Cognition, Animal Behavior and Cognition, Journal of Comparative Psychology,
International Journal of Comparative Psychology, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Ani-
mal Learning and Cognition, Frontiers in Psychology: Comparative Psychology.
Researchers then completed five blocks of questions about research methods and their atti-
tudes to various issues facing animal cognition research. The order of the blocks was random-
ized between participants. Each block was presented on one page of the survey, with a line
separating between the first set and second set of questions in each block. The exact questions
and formatting of each block are presented in Figs 1–5.
Bias
This block contained 7 questions about bias in animal cognition research. Questions 1 to
3 asked about researchers’ attitude towards bias in their own research: whether they
hoped for particular results when performing experiments; whether they are concerned
that they might bias the results of their studies towards certain results and whether they
thought they could detach from any biases to perform objectively fair tests of animal
cognition.
Questions 4–7 asked about bias across animal cognition research: whether they think the
results and theories in their own area, and in other areas, of animal cognition are strongly
affected by researchers’ biases, and whether, if they knew the topic and the authors, they would
be able to guess the conclusions of a published study without reading it. Question 7 asked
whether they thought that Morgan’s canon is important to use in animal cognition research,
and, before answering the question, participants read the following introductory text: Mor-
gan’s canon states that: "In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher
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Fig 1. The bias questions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g001
PLOS ONE Attitudes about animal congition
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607 August 31, 2021 5 / 39
Fig 2. The publication questions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g002
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Fig 3. The replicability questions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g003
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Fig 4. The statistics questions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g004
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psychological processes if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower in
the scale of psychological evolution and development."
Question 8 then asked researchers for any other comments about the Bias questions.
Fig 5. The belief questions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g005
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Publication
This block contained 7 questions on publication practices in animal cognition research. All
questions had an NA option, which we have excluded here for brevity. The first 3 questions
focused on the claims that researchers make when publishing papers, and the last 4 questions
focused on publication bias, asking researchers the percent of their studies that are, or will be,
published, and the reasons some of their studies go unpublished. Question 7 asked researchers
for any other comments about the Publication questions.
Replicability
This block contained 9 questions on researchers’ attitudes towards replicability in ani-
mal cognition research. Questions 1 and 2 concerned the likely success of replication
studies in the researcher’s area of animal cognition research, and Questions 3 and 4
asked researchers whether their own, or some, areas of animal cognition research would
experience a “replication crisis” if attempts to replicate most of its studies were con-
ducted. Question 5 then asked whether researchers thought they could identify animal
cognition studies that would successfully replicate and those which would not. Ques-
tions 6 to 8 next asked about the importance and frequency of replications in the field,
Question 9 then asked researchers for any other comments about the Replication
questions.
Statistics
This block contained 6 questions on the use of statistics in animal cognition research. Ques-
tions 1 and 2 concerned the confidence researchers have in their understanding of their own
statistical analyses, Question 3 focused on their self-reported understanding of others’ statisti-
cal analyses, and Questions 4 and 5 then asked about the prevalence of questionable research
practices [44] in animal cognition research. Question 6 then asked researchers for any other
comments about the Statistics questions. Before Questions 4 and 5, participants read a brief
description of some questionable research practices:
There is growing concern that researchers use false positive inflating research practices in sci-
ence, such as:
Performing many analyses and selectively reporting the statistically significant ones
Reporting an unexpected finding as if it was predicted from the start
Data dredging/p-hacking/fishing for significance
Selectively excluding data points to produce a significant/desired result
Collecting more data until a significant/desired result is obtained
Belief
This block contained 6 questions on how researchers derive their beliefs about animal cogni-
tion. Questions 1, 2 and 3 asked about the role of scientific research and researchers’ day-to-
day experience in forming their beliefs about animal cognition, and Questions 4 and 5 asked
how often researchers agree with the claims made in scientific papers. Finally, Question 6
asked researchers for any other comments about the Belief questions.
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Free-text analysis
Throughout the results, we provide direct quotes of participants’ answers to the free-text
responses. These quotes were taken from participants who, at the end of the survey, opted in for
their free-text answers to be shared openly and were screened for any identifying information. If a
free-text response contained clearly identifying information, it was excluded from the open data-
set. All the free-text answers for which we received consent to share, and which did not contain
identifying information are openly available at osf.io/6j7kp. In addition to directly quoting partici-
pants’ free-text answers, of which only a minority could be included in the report, we also catego-
rized their free-text responses based on the common themes that they included within each block.
First, one author (BGF) read through all responses and identified common themes in participants’
responses. He then marked whether each response fit each category or not. If a response matched
more than one category, this was still recorded, i.e., a single response could in principle fit all the
categories. A second author (LO) was given the category descriptions and, blind to the first coder’s
decisions, also marked whether each response fit each category or not. Of BGF’s 481 decisions to
label a response with a category, LO independently agreed with 402 (83.6%) of them. In addition,
LO made 103 classifications that BGF had not originally and suggested four further category
labels, three of which were retained. Each disagreement was resolved by discussion between BGF
and LO, with the most disagreements either being an error from one of the two coders originally,
or cases where both coders agreed that the statement was ambiguous, i.e., there were no cases of
disagreement that could not be resolved through discussion. Our category-based analyses are pre-
sented for the Publication, Statistics, Replication and Belief blocks. For the Bias block, we chose to
split the results of the open-ended question (“Do you have any other comments about bias in ani-
mal cognition research?”) into two tables, as participants’ free-text responses were split between
providing examples of biases in animal cognition research and elaborating on their Likert-type
responses to the question about Morgan’s canon. In addition to our category based-analysis, we
also present some quotes in-text that we felt highlighted an important topic that our category-
based analysis might have missed. Where some themes occurred across blocks of topics but were
not necessarily directly related to the topic in question, we present these in a “miscellaneous” sec-
tion, although this was not performed systematically.
Results
Demographics
From 1001 invitations, we received 210 completed surveys (response rate = 21.6%). Our sample
of researchers had published a median of 17 papers on topics in animal cognition (IQR: 8–50)
and had been active in the field for a median of 14 years (IQR: 8–25). Table 1 displays these
Table 1. The number of papers published and years active in animal cognition of the 210 researchers completing
the survey.
Number of papers 0 1–5 6–10 11–25 25–75 > 75
% 0.4 17.6 22.8 19.5 24.8 14.8
N 1 37 48 41 52 31
Years active 0 1–3 3–7 8–15 15–25 >25
% 0.4 2.3 18.1 28.1 21.4 20.5
N 1 5 38 59 45 43
One response for years active was left blank and therefore excluded. The one researcher who reported 0 for papers
published and years active later described publishing in at least one of our target articles, suggesting that the 0
responses may have been in error.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.t001
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demographics. An exploratory k-means cluster analysis of participants’ endorsement of key
words describing their research suggested that we had two main groups of participants complet-
ing the survey—a larger group of researchers in animal cognition and comparative psychology,
and a smaller group of behavioural ecologists (see Supporting Information for details).
Bias
We asked researchers about bias in their own experiments, and their perceptions of bias across
the field. Researchers frequently reported either sometimes (39.7% of respondents) or often
(38.8%) hoping for one result over another when performing research, and researchers were
split between either being rarely concerned (36.5%) or sometimes concerned (30.3%) that they
might bias the results of their studies towards a certain conclusion. Nevertheless, they reported
that they could often (45.8%) or always (38.4%) detach from any biases to perform objectively
fair tests of animal cognition (Fig 6).
In terms of bias across the field, researchers were split between agreeing (29.6%), disagree-
ing (23.8%) and neither agreeing nor disagreeing (36.4%) that the results and theories in their
own area of animal cognition are strongly affected by researchers’ biases. Responses were simi-
lar when researchers were asked to consider bias in other areas of animal cognition, but more
researchers agreed that the results and theories are strongly affected by researchers’ biases
(agree: 36.0%; neither agree nor disagree: 39.0%; disagree 14.5%). Researchers were split
between agreeing (34.0%), disagreeing (22.3%) or neither agreeing or disagreeing (30.6%) that
if they knew the topic and the authors, they would be able to guess the conclusions of a study
without reading it (Fig 7). Notably, most respondents tended to avoid the extreme responses—
no more than 10.5% of respondents chose the strongly agree or strongly disagree for these
questions on bias.
We received 68 free-text responses concerning bias in the field, many of which elaborated
on the question about Morgan’s canon. However, researchers reported a diverse range of atti-
tudes towards bias in the field. While most researchers reported they could detach from their
own biases readily on the Likert-measure (Fig 6), perhaps through using measures such as
blinding, other researchers expressed skepticism about the ability to perform research
objectively:
“As to the first three questions on my own bias—it is NEVER possible to detach yourself from
your own biases. You can only try your best and take as many steps as possible to control for
this, which I do. . . As to hoping for one result over another—as negative results are unpublish-
able, any sane scientist will hope for positive results. Our careers, and often our livelihoods,
rely on getting positive results and publishing them. Too much is at stake to pretend that there
is no bias.”
Researchers indicated several different forms of bias that might affect animal cognition
research, ranging from anthropomorphism and confirming “higher” abilities in animals, to
excessive skepticism. Table 2 presents a selection of these reported biases.
Morgan’s canon, simplicity, and parsimony
We next asked researchers about the role of Morgan’s canon. Most researchers agreed some-
what (38.6%) or strongly (31.9%) that Morgan’s canon is important to consider when inter-
preting the results of animal cognition research (Fig 8). However, researchers often elaborated
on these answers in the free text responses, revealing a more nuanced perspective of the use of
Morgan’s canon, which are detailed in Table 3.
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Publication
We asked researchers whether they believe themselves and others to make appropriate claims
when submitting research for publication, and how many of their studies end up being pub-
lished. When submitting papers for publication, 86.0% of researchers reported that they make
Fig 6. Animal cognition researchers’ self-reported concern about bias in their own studies (N = 210). Percentages may not add to 100% due to a small number
of NA responses.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g006
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appropriate claims given their data, while only a small number stated that they overclaim
(7.7%) or underclaim (5.8%). In contrast, our sample was split between believing that other
researchers were likely to make stronger claims than warranted by their data (56%), and believ-
ing that others make appropriate claims (43%, Fig 9). Researchers reported that their own
claims usually stayed the same (69.0%) or became weaker (21.0%) after peer review. A minor-
ity of researchers reported that their claims increased in strength (9.0%). When asked how
Fig 7. Animal cognition researchers’ self-reported concern about bias in animal cognition research (N = 210).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g007
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many of their studies had, or for ongoing studies, will, end in publication, the median response
was 80% (IQR: 70% - 90%, Fig 10). However, there was a large spread in responses, with 23
respondents saying 50% or fewer of their studies have been published, and 17 reporting that
they have published all of their studies.
We received 144 free-text responses from researchers explaining why certain studies of
theirs had not been published. The responses suggested several different causes of publication
bias in the field. Some researchers reported self-filtering studies they deemed of little
importance:
“I have a few studies that are just not adequate to publish, in terms of experimental design,
subject size, or no informative findings (and I’m including null results as potentially informa-
tive). These are my own issues, not that of the publication process.”
Another reported cause of self-driven publication bias was a lack of incentives to publish all
research, either due to time constraints or perceptions of how publishing all work would affect
funding opportunities:
“My position is dependent on grant funding, this contingency is coercive to publishing only the
studies that strengthen the grant.”
Although not one of our identified themes, sixteen researchers (11% of free-text responses)
also reported that publication bias was enforced by journals, reviewers and editors:
“Consistent rejection across journals, which typically reported that the findings were not
"attractive enough" (e.g., replications, inconclusive results, etc.)”
Through our categorization analysis, the most common themes we identified were articles
not being published for containing inconclusive results (31), design limitations (30), negative
results (29), insufficient resources for publication (29) and too few data (28). In Table 4, we
highlight quotes from each of the 10 themes we identified in the responses. Next, Table 5
Table 2. Animal cognition researchers’ beliefs about bias in animal cognition research.
Do you have any other comments about
bias in animal cognition research?
N Exemplars
Provided an example of bias 31 “Bias is of two kinds: (a) bias against animals in comparison with
humans (pro-human bias) and (b) bias to interpret animal
behaviour as evidence for complex cognition (pro-animal bias).
Both kinds of bias undermine the legitimacy of animal cognition
research.”
Suggested that bias is predominantly in how
the data are interpreted
30 “The bias I typically see is a bias to produce a narrative that goes
beyond the data, I am not sure whether that bias goes into the
design/approach that produces the data. I almost never have
concerns that design/data might be unethically tweaked (i.e.,
conscious bias).”
Suggested that bias is inherent to many study
designs
29 “It is often in the selection of the behavioral markers that the
biases are most strongly evident, so the biases are well-entrenched
well before data analysis. Given the modern trend to only provide
heuristic descriptions of what was measured and reliance on
inter-observer reliability to justify those measurements means
that the rationale used for the selection process is usually hidden
from the reader. This makes it difficult to identify the implicit
biases in the study.”
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.t002
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Fig 8. Animal cognition researchers’ endorsement of Morgan’s canon (N = 210).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g008
Table 3. Animal cognition researchers’ attitudes towards Morgan’s canon as a tool in animal cognition research.
Do you have any other comments about bias in
animal cognition research? Answers that
referenced Morgan’s canon
N Exemplars
Caveated or criticized the use of Morgan’s Canon 16 “In my opinion, Morgan’s canon often leads to more bias
rather than less. As scientists, it is important to have an
open mind in both directions. E.g. looking at the
evolutionary tree of a species when interpreting its
behaviour is often more conclusive that Morgan’s
canon.”
“I think that biases on the cognitive processes underlying
certain behaviours can go both ways. One could
overstate the complexity, as much as one could
underestimate it. That is why in general I do not
consider Morgan’s canon to be always useful: to use it
best, we would need to have a clear understanding of
what process "stand lower in the scale of psychological
evolution" without pre-existing biases.”
Suggested that parsimony is important when
interpreting data
30 “In terms of Morgan’s canon, it is not dissimilar to
parsimony in phylogenetics or Occam’s razor in normal
scientific inquiry. Showing skepticism in cause does not
suggest that more complicated cognitive explanations
exist, but the onus is on the researcher to demonstrate.”
“While Morgan’s canon is useful as a philosophical tool,
I do think that it often conflicts with parsimony
arguments made from phylogeny, so in practice I feel it
often does not help per se.”
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.t003
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highlights several quotes from the open-ended free-text question about publication practices
in animal cognition.
Statistics
We asked researchers about their confidence in their own statistical analyses, their ability to
assess others’ analyses, and the rate of questionable research practices in the field. Researchers
strongly or somewhat agreed that when they perform a statistical analysis, they know it is
appropriate and valid (strongly agree: 53.2%, somewhat agree 42.9%), and that they could
explain why this was the case to another researcher (strongly agree: 59.5%, somewhat agree
36.6%, Fig 11). When reading or reviewing others’ research, our sample reported that they
could often (59.8%), sometimes (23.4%) or always (12.4%) assess the validity of the analysis. A
minority of researchers reported that they could rarely (3.8%), or never (0.5%) assess the valid-
ity of the analysis. When asked how often they themselves or other researchers performed
questionable research practices (QRPs), which may induce false positive findings, researchers
reported that they themselves rarely (41.1%), never (31.2%), or sometimes (20.3%) conducted
QRPs. However, researchers thought that others either sometimes (52.7%), often (27.9%), or
rarely (18.4%) did so (Fig 12). We received 66 free-text responses about the use of statistics in
Fig 9. Animal cognition researchers’ beliefs about overclaiming and underclaiming when submitting research articles for publication, N = 210.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g009
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the field, from which we identified 13 general themes. These themes are highlighted in Table 6,
accompanied by example quotations.
Replication
We asked researchers what proportion of replication studies they expect would be success-
ful in their area of research, and to what extent their own and other areas of animal
Fig 10. Animal cognition researchers’ self-reported proportion of studies that they have run and then published. N = 208. Each dot represents
one researcher’s answer to the question “What percent of the studies that you have performed have been published and/or you think will be
published?”, and a boxplot showing the median and inter-quartile ranges is laid underneath.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g010
Table 4. Animal cognition researchers’ explanations for why some of their studies go unpublished.
Why was your animal cognition
study not published?
N Exemplars
Inconclusive results 31 “The results were not so clear to discuss something.”
Design limitation 30 “Something about experiment was faulty so didn’t bother submitting. Or,
something was pointed out in peer review that made the study seem not
worth trying to publish.”
Negative or uninteresting results 29 “It was just too difficult to get "negative results" past referees.”
Lack of resources 29 “Mostly [due to] time to write the studies up. I have too many on my "to
do" list”
Too few data 28 “Not enough data for reliable conclusions”
Unreliable data 17 “Because the design was weak, the experimenter unexperienced. . . I just
wasn’t sure whether to trust the data and I did not want to publish any
potential false positive/negative findings”
Reviewer bias 13 “Theoretical rivals killed the publication because the outcomes didn’t fit
with their theory”
Irrelevant data 8 “The data were incomprehensible, and it appeared the animals failed to
learn anything related to the task.”
Training failure 5 “I often decide not to publish studies if the animals were unable to train to
the basic level required to complete the study”
Replication studies 2 “Non-significant results or that only previously published outcomes were
replicated”
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.t004
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cognition would experience a replication crisis, if many of its studies were replicated. If
100 typical studies in their research area were replicated, researchers believed that 65%
(IQR: 50% - 75%) would replicate successfully if the replication study tested a new sample
of the same size with the same protocol as the original study. If these replication studies
used sample sizes of 1000, researchers estimated that 72% would replicate successfully
(IQR: 50% - 82%, Fig 13).
Predominantly, researchers somewhat agreed (34.0%) or somewhat disagreed (30.1%) that
their area of animal cognition research would experience a replication crisis if attempts to rep-
licate most of its studies were conducted, and they either somewhat (43.7%) or strongly
(29.3%) agreed that some other areas of animal cognition research would experience a replica-
tion crisis. Researchers tended to somewhat agree (38.0%), or neither agree nor disagree
(31.2%) that they could identify which animal cognition studies would successfully replicate
and which would not (Fig 14). When asked about the importance and prevalence of replication
studies, researchers disagreed (50.7%) or strongly disagreed (20.1%) that enough replication
studies were performed in their area of animal cognition research. These Figs were matched
when researchers were asked to consider replications in animal cognition research in general
(disagree: 55.5%, strongly disagree: 23.6%). The vast majority of researchers agreed (34.8%) or
strongly agreed (54.8%) that it is important that replication studies are performed in animal
cognition research (Fig 15). We received 64 free-text responses about replication in the field,
with researchers most often highlighting various complexities and nuances of replication in
animal cognition research Table 7.
Belief
When reading papers in their own area of research, and other areas of animal cognition
research, our sample reported often or sometimes agreeing with the authors’ conclusions (own
area: often: 58.4%, sometimes: 38.3%; other area: often: 58.5%, sometimes: 36.2%, Fig 16).
Researchers somewhat and strongly agreed that their beliefs about animals’ cognition are
affected by both scientific experiments (strongly agree: 55.7%, somewhat agree: 34.3%) and
their day-to-day experience with animals (strongly agree: 31.9%, somewhat agree: 34.3%, Fig
16). When asked to choose between scientific experiments and experience with a slider
response (with science at one extreme and experience at the other), researchers tended to say
Table 5. Animal cognition researchers’ opinions on publication practices in the field.
Do you have any other comments about
publication in animal cognition?
N Exemplars
Highlighted the difficulty of getting negative
results published
15 “It is next to impossible to publish negative results in animal
cognition.”
Highlighted the difficulty of interpreting
negative results
7 “Studies with negative results often needs additional controls to
show it is a true negative; most often animal cognition studies are
initially designed to control for that a potentially positive result is
a true positive. There are many more ways for something to be
negative than to be positive, therefor particular care must be given
when publishing such data (negative or no results can often be the
result of a bad design).”
Highlighted an excessive focus on
publishing “exciting” or “novel” results
7 “There are still strong incentives towards publishing "wow!"
findings showcasing supposedly "clever" or "human-like" abilities.”
Lack of time to publish everything 3 “I just have not had time to publish them.”
Other/Other barriers to publishing in
animal cognition
15 “There is a constant pull of the wishful thinking. If we let this go
on unchecked, it will eventually converge on what people already
think is true and/or what they wish were true.”
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.t005
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their beliefs were more driven by science, although a range of responses were observed (median:
31, IQR: 19–51, where 0 is exclusively based on science, and 100 exclusively based on experi-
ence, Fig 17). We received 42 free-text responses about beliefs in animal cognition, from which
we identified 5 common themes. Table 8 outlines these themes and provides example quotes,
and, although it did not fit one of our themes, we highlight another interesting quote below:
I think you can almost always find a scientific paper to confirm your beliefs, and can find a
way of justifying paying attention to that one, and ignoring one that might give different
results. I don’t mean this cynically—but humans are very good at piecing together a plausible
seeming story with limited evidence! (We’re good storytellers, and it can take a lot of evidence
to dissuade someone from a good story!)
Miscellaneous
Throughout the survey, we perceived five themes across our survey blocks that our within-
block coding did not identify. As such these themes were not those systematically extracted,
but themes we subjectively believed came up across blocks and wanted to highlight. These
were the role of theory in animal cognition, the need for an individual-level focus in research,
academic incentives, the large amount of heterogeneity across animal cognition research, and
the uncertainty surrounding the causes and implications of negative results. We provide repre-
sentative quotes for each below.
Fig 11. Animal cognition researchers’ self-reported confidence in their own statistical analyses, N = 210.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g011
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Theory
“In my view a far bigger problem is poor theorizing [compared with replication]. A lack of for-
mal theory (as exists in evolutionary biology) combined with "scala naturae" thinking, a lack
of consideration of natural history and incentives to show that your study animal is "clever"
or human-like are major problems for the field.”
Individual-level research
“It is unfortunate that Single-Case experimental designs (single subject, single-organism, etc)
are not used more often, which are known to (a) highlight replication and reproducibility, (b)
avoid many hypothesis-testing issues (including, but not limited to those listed above), and (c)
avoid many group-design limitations for behavioral research.”
“Learning occurs in individual organisms, not aggregate population parameters, yet the field
is convinced chasing p-values provides meaningfulness. There’s a fundamental misunder-
standing of what NHST offers us. Behaviorists could look at a cumulative curve from a single
organism, and show an effect because the learning was so obvious. The cognitivist turned to
NHST because effects were not clear, so more digging was required because the quantitative
imperative required quantitative measurement for an enterprise to be considered science.
Fig 12. Animal cognition researchers’ self-reported use of questionable research practices, and their estimated use of questionable research practices
(QRPs) by other researchers in the field.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g012
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NHST poisoned the well, and is directly to blame for the first 3, and 5th, bullet of your list
above [said in reference to the questionable research practices of: performing many analyses
and selectively reporting the statistically significant ones; data dredging/p-hacking/fishing
for significance and; collecting more data until a significant/desired result is obtained].”
“[In respect to replication] This approach assumes that the observer will have no effect, and
that variables that will affect the study but that may not be mentioned it (because there are an
Table 6. Animal cognition researchers’ comments about the use of statistics in the field.
Do you have any comments about
statistics in animal cognition?
N Exemplars
Lack of training 15 “I think that a lot of statistical mispractice also stems from missing
knowledge/proficiency regarding statistical software and/or methods/
tests. The majority of animal cognition researchers have a very sparse
statistical education and are therefore self-taught. This can be a huge
potential for errors.”
Complex statistics as a barrier 11 “The increasing use of highly complex stats (e.g. Bayesian GLIM
modelling) doesn’t always help. I’m doubtful if most users can work
out which variables are being treated as fixed effects in their analyses,
for instances, and which of them should be. I certainly can’t!”
“This comment goes beyond animal cognition, but basically you need
a second PhD in statistics to handle analyses these days. I think we
are all doing our best, but there is only so much we can teach
ourselves about statistics when we are also bogged down with our
actual research, teaching, grants, etc.”
A problem of low power or small sample
research
9 “Depending on the species, many problems stem from smaller sample
sizes being treated in the same way as large samples.”
Incentive structure promotes
questionable research practices
9 “I also think current publishing requirements and standards are
much to blame for these practices. Papers need to be short and
concise, and it is more difficult to write a nice story when unexpected
findings were not predicted. Journals also want the newer, exciting
results more often than a simple, non-significant story. This doesn’t
mean these practices are acceptable or should be done, but not
everyone can/will fight for ethical scientific standards when an easier
solution is highly rewarded.”
Questionable research practices not
necessarily bad
8 “Sometimes it does happen that you conduct a study with very
different intentions than the result you get. In hindsight it would have
been a reasonable prediction, and framing it as such can help make a
paper clearer.” “In some cases I don’t think there is anything wrong
with this but there is a fine line.”
Discussed solutions 7 “I worry about trendy "bandwagons" and fashions. Rather than
prescribing particular approaches (e.g. we should all be Bayesians
now) statistics should be reported clearly, transparently and in detail
(e.g. I have no issue with people reporting p values if they want to, as
long as they report effect sizes, associated errors and confidence
intervals and visual representations of raw data).”
An anecdote of QRPs 6 “I have occasionally heard researchers pushing for collecting
additional data to boost a trend, but it is difficult to estimate how
common this practice is.”
Individual-level statistics important 5 “At times, the search for population statistics obscures the attempts to
understand individual variation. In other words, trying to forge a
coherent analysis of many small NS may be more fruitful than
statistics based on one large N.”
Collaborating with statisticians 5 “I find myself not so knowledgeable about new statistical techniques,
so use a statistician.”
Four themes with a smaller number of responses are not shown (pre-registraion as a named solution (3), Bayesian
statistics as a named solution (3), QRPs being less of a problem in animal cognition research (2), and the dangers of
dichotomising research at p = 0.05 (2).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.t006
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infinite number of variables in even the simplest study that all of them cannot be mentioned
and/or equated). This approach assumed that the history of the nonhumans will be the same
in replication, which can never be assured and is all too often ignored. This assumes that such
things as "personality variables" will all be "smoothed out the greater the N. This assumes that
the "observer" is independent of the date collected and that the observer’s actions do not differ-
entially affect the actions/behavior of the organism observed. Such assumptions can’t possibly
be valid for living beings with individually distinct histories—in anything like the way that are
true for chemistry and physics.”
Negative results
“I usually never finish a study which I realize was misconstrued when I see the first behaviors
of the animals. Oftentimes it is easy to arm chair-design a study which turns out to be impossi-
ble for practical and other reasons. This is not saying that I have not published finished studies
with negative result. However, studies with negative results often needs additional controls to
Fig 13. Animal cognition researchers’ predictions of replication success in their field, Nsame sample size = 207, Nlarge sample = 205. Each dot represents one
researcher’s estimate of what proportion of studies in their research area would successfully replicate if these studies were replicated with a similar sample size
(top panel) or a sample size of 1000 animals (bottom panel), with boxplots showing the median and inter-quartile ranges laid underneath.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g013
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show it is a true negative; most often animal cognition studies are initially designed to control
for that a potentially positive result is a true positive. There are many more ways for some-
thing to be negative than to be positive, therefor particular care must be given when publishing
such data (negative or no results can often be the result of a bad design).”
Incentives
“In my opinion, the drive to publish ’exciting results’ is driven by the expectations of funding
bodies, and the general competitiveness of the academic system, that expect people to con-
stantly produce ground-breaking new research. Not all research is or can be ground-breaking,
but is a necessary part of research progress, such as proposals for methodological improve-
ments. Such research deserves more support from the research community. Shifting the weight
in expectations on researchers might reduce peoples’ need to over-interpret borderline p values
and report ’impactful’ findings where there is really little to none.”
Fig 14. Animal cognition researchers’ perceptions of a replication crisis in the discipline, and their ability to identity studies that would not replicate,
N = 210.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g014
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Heterogeneity. The issue of heterogeneity is perhaps the largest caveat to our survey results.
For many questions, some researchers said that their answers would vary depending on the
exact area of research or identity of the researchers. For example, researchers may believe that
questionable research practices are rarely used by most researchers, but often used by a minor-
ity, or believe that results in one area of research (e.g., animal learning) might be more replica-
ble than others:
“I wish the second section above had used the terms of the first section (i.e., rarely, sometimes,
always. . .) because in my experience the biases occur with some authors/scientists rather than
in a specific section of animal cognition. I also wish the statements in the second section
hadn’t included the word "strongly" in them. There are certain authors whose papers I can
predict will have questionable methods and over-interpreted results rather than finding that
in a specific area of animal cognition. Generally, I find more careful work in comparative psy-
chologists’ papers than in papers from other fields for animal cognition work.”
Fig 15. Animal cognition researchers’ perceptions of the frequency and importance of replication studies in the discipline, N = 210.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g015
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“I don’t agree with the question about my belief about other researchers tending to make weak
or strong claims given their data. The answer should have been one of choosing the percent
that I believe make stronger claims than warranted. Most researchers (70%) I believe make
appropriate claims, but some (30%) do make stronger claims than warranted.”
“[Some of the] responses above are misleading averages. Sometimes I find on peer review I
have overclaimed, sometimes that I have underclaimed, and the same is true of authors whose
work I review.”
Table 7. Animal cognition researchers’ beliefs about replication in animal cognition research.
Do you have any comments about
replication in animal cognition?
N Quotes
Complexity of replication 27 “As results appear to be heavily influenced by all sorts of things—
history and experiences of the animals, particularities of the facility,
particularities of the group structure and (sub-)culture of the
animals, the experiment paradigm details, reward distribution,
training protocol. . .—replication is horribly difficult.”
Lack of Incentives 16 “Journals are more and more looking for novel ideas and results, and
unfortunately replication studies are seen as unimportant, unless
they shockingly dismiss some big ideas.”
“Like other areas of research, the current publishing system values
novelty and I believe this to be a major limitation that has
discouraged replication in cognition research.”
“Funding to conduct replication studies is more difficult to obtain,
than for novel studies”
Importance of converging evidence 8 “The term "replication" is not entirely straightforward. A strong
replication is not always using the same protocol or the same stats
and arrive at the same conclusion. I believe that a well-replicated
result is something that shows to be correct when using a variety of
methods and approaches and still arrive at a very similar conclusion.
I think that this is true for several areas in animal cognition.”
“I think interpretation is a bigger issue than replication.
Even under describing the methods (sometimes many important
details are omitted) is a bigger issue.
I DO think replication is important, but as we look across
experiments, even though they are not exact replications, I think we
can see the trends in what is likely a real effect and what may be
something that could not be replicated. We should be training
students how to look for these trends though.”
“Depends very much on the topic, and what is meant by replication.
In controversial areas, such as episodic memory in animals, there
has been numerous attempts to demonstrate or refute, but often with
different species. This involves attempts to replicate a phenomenon,
but not necessarily a particular study.”
Issues with bias and validity more
problematic than replicability issues
7 “At least in my subfield of animal cognition the replicability of
studies might actually be viewed as a negative because the
assumptions and interpretations of the studies are fundamentally
flawed. So the studies replicate, but researchers take those
replications as additional evidence for the validity of their paradigm
when it is not.”
Between area heterogeneity in replicability 5 “Confidence in my own area of research has to do with the common
practice of "embedded replications" of successful previous work in
my work. My lack of confidence in some other cases has to do with
demonstrations with sparse background literature/experimentation
to back it up.”
Legal or ethical barriers to replication 3 “One problem with replication in the context of animal work is the
clash with the ethical pressure to minimise animal use.”
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.t007
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Discussion
Our survey provides a picture of animal cognition researchers’ beliefs about bias and scientific
practice. From 1001 invitations, we received 210 completed surveys, from which we analysed
data on a range of controversial topics and possible biases in animal cognition research. While
it is likely that there was a self-selection bias in who completed our surveys, with researchers
who have stronger feelings about bias in the field presumably being most likely to complete
our survey, 210 completed surveys reflects a large number of recently active animal cognition
researchers. Before discussing the individual survey topics, we wish to outline what we believe
the data from surveys like our own are useful for and what they are not. Specifically, we do not
believe that these data are very accurate or representative data of all animal cognition research-
ers’ beliefs, or very accurate estimates of, for example, the absolute rate of questionable
research practice use in the field (see e.g. 42]). Rather, they must be interpreted considering
the likely sampling biases in who participated in our survey and how their answers were lim-
ited by the way the questions were asked. Specifically, the strongest sampling bias is likely that
the researchers who completed the survey, and especially those providing detailed free-text
responses. These individuals are likely those who have thought most about some of the issues
presented in the survey, and are potentially the most concerned about some of these issues
(e.g., reliability) than researchers who did not complete the survey. This might mean that some
of the quantitative estimates, e.g., perceptions of a replication crisis, might overestimate the
“average” response of animal cognition researchers to this question, but equally might
Fig 16. Animal cognition researchers’ tendency to agree with the conclusions of papers in their own and other areas of research. N = 210.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g016
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underestimate the concern about bias within their own results–if these researchers are more
likely to e.g., adopt blinding strategies. Nevertheless, each individual response that we received
reflects the opinion of a particular animal cognition researcher, and thus are inherently mean-
ingful pieces of data, with detailed full-text responses available at osf.io/6j7kp. For individuals
new to the field, for example new PhD students, the data offer an accessible window into some
of the perceived issues within animal cognition research, and the commonality of some of
them, that are often not readily available in the literature in such a candid fashion. Moreover,
these data can provide evidence of publication bias, questionable research practices and (lack
of) confidence in some of the field’s findings, and the mechanisms underlying them, which
can be used to both stimulate debate within research groups and support theoretical arguments
about the status of animal cognition research. Finally, the data–especially the free text data—
offer a clear window on the barriers researchers feel inhibit progress in animal cognition
research. These data will be particularly useful for PIs, editorial boards, hiring committees and
funders to make decisions on policy changes that might facilitate stronger science in animal
cognition. We now discuss the specific findings of our survey, and compare these to similar
studies across disciplines, before outlining some of the ways we believe animal cognition
research can improve in light of these data.
Fig 17. Animal cognition researchers’ reports of the role of science and daily experience in shaping their beliefs
about animals’ cognition. N = 210. Top: Answers to individual questions on the role of experience and science.
Bottom: Researchers’ responses about the relative role of science and experience. Each dot represents one researcher’s
response. with boxplots showing the median and inter-quartile ranges laid underneath.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.g017
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Bias
Overall, researchers were wary of bias across animal cognition research. Researchers often
agreed, or neither agreed nor disagreed, that the results and theories across animal cognition
are strongly affected by researchers’ biases. For example, some researchers’ qualitative
responses suggested that they believe bias not to be uniform across the field, instead reporting
that certain topics and researchers may be more likely to be affected by bias than others. Simi-
lar to other survey studies of scientific bias, our participants were generally more concerned
about bias in others’ research than their own [43,44], although there were exceptions, often
being both very conscious about the possibility of bias in their own and others’ work. This was
especially pronounced for experimenter bias, where researchers did not appear especially con-
cerned that they might be biasing their own results, and were, on average, confident they could
perform fair tests of animal cognition. This somewhat conflicts with primary data suggesting
that experimenter effects can have a large influence on animal behaviour [50,51], and that
blinding procedures are rarely reported [19]. This confidence in avoiding experimenter effects
might reflect an overrepresentation of researchers in our survey who take steps such as blind-
ing to minimise these effects in their research, or who believe their experiments should be
unaffected (e.g., by not being in contact with animals during testing due to using touchscreen
apparatus). However, we also received some strong responses from researchers who fervently
Table 8. Animal cognition researchers’ beliefs about the role of science and day-to-day experience in shaping
their beliefs about the cognition of animals.
Do you have any comments about belief in
animal cognition?
N Quotes
Experience acts as a source of scientific
hypotheses
11 “Observations and experiences may give you hints about
possible study questions. They leave you with impressions of
animals’ mind that require further digging into. Science,
however, is absolutely vital to yield actual knowledge.”
Bias in scientific results prevents them
impacting beliefs
10 “I am hesitant to say that the results of scientific experiments
affects my beliefs about animal cognition. This is mainly
because I know that many studies are poorly executed, and it is
the norm to make huge claims with no or limited data to back
it up. Certain authors make careers out of their great skills at
hyperbole, and I find this ethically unacceptable. On the other
hand, there are authors that perform good science and don’t
make exaggerated claims. These studies I take seriously, and
the work of such authors does indeed have the potential to
affect my beliefs about animal cognition.”
Science can answer questions experience can’t 9 “There are a lot of species studied. . .so even experts in the field
could only obtain knowledge about that species by reading
papers (for the most part).”
The role of science and experience shaping
belief varies depending on the topic
7 “There are deep questions and shallow questions. Deep
questions, like whether a crow has consciousness, can only be
answered by a scientific theory of the concept. Shallow
questions, like whether a dog has a memory of where a bone
was buried, can be answered with empirical observations.”
Experience with animals can be valid data in
itself, and/or necessary for producing valid data
5 “What exists in the literature is relatively limited compared to
the richness of experiences that working with animals regularly
offers. Individual experiences, even if one-offs, can be very
provocative indicators of cognitive potentials.”
“The definition of "cognition" is fuzzy and not recognized as
"fuzzy," most students are taught to "operationalize" and to
"standardize" their data, before they know enough about the
natural behavior of the animals to be able to perform those
types of procedures appropriately and it is in these procedures
that bias inevitably and unwittingly enters into their research.”
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256607.t008
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believed that researchers always hope for particular results and thus should always be con-
cerned that they might be biasing their results, and several researchers noted how bias can be
embedded in research programmes even before data collection begins.
Similarly, while researchers believed that other animal cognition researchers sometimes use
questionable research practices and overclaim when submitting papers to journals, they
reported that they themselves were less likely to do so. This replicates the patterns observed in
similar survey studies in psychology and ecology and evolution [43,44]. However, several
researchers caveated their answers in the free text responses, highlighting how bias might not
be uniform across the field. For example, some researchers reported that some areas of
research might be weakly affected by bias and questionable research practices, but other areas
and researchers more so.
Our survey results also provide direct evidence of publication bias in animal cognition
research, self-reported by active researchers in the field. The median percentage of studies
researchers reported publishing was 80%, although over 10% researchers reported publishing
less than 50% of their studies. These figures may underestimate the prevalence of publication
bias both within our sample and in animal cognition more generally. Within our sample, the
figures may be an underestimate as published findings are likely easier to recall for participants
while they were completing the survey (i.e., an availability bias [52]). In animal cognition more
broadly, the figures may be an underestimate if our participants were more likely to publish
negative results than the average animal cognition researcher. While researchers reported a
journal or reviewer enforced publication bias against negative results or against results not in
line with “preferred” theories, many researchers also reported not attempting to publish stud-
ies with difficult to interpret results, or those that had flaws in the experimental design or were
otherwise perceived to be low quality. Notably, this decision not to publish was often the
researcher’s own, with a lack of time or incentives often cited as the limiting factor. Combining
participants’ quantitative and qualitative responses suggests that across most areas of animal
cognition research, many studies have been performed but not published. This suggests that
the published literature may not be representative of all research conducted in animal cogni-
tion, which makes it hard to evaluate the strength of evidence for many effects from the litera-
ture alone. Because of this, attempts at evidence synthesis, whether through meta-analysis,
review articles or even introductions to experimental pieces should seek to evaluate the extent
and consequences of publication bias in their topic area.
Given the degree of concern about bias in research in animal cognition–especially in
others’ research–scientists in animal cognition could take steps to mitigate bias, and,
through embracing transparency throughout the research process, demonstrate this trust-
worthiness to others. While there is currently no central repository or systematic method
for study registration (c.f. https://clinicaltrials.gov/ for medical trials), research groups
could seek to publicly archive all studies they conduct, which would allow other research-
ers to assess the strength of evidence not just from individual studies, but in relation to
the entire research programme they have come from. Within individual studies, registered
reports in which authors receive peer review and in-principal acceptance before conduct-
ing data collection [53,54], have the threefold benefit of removing results-dependent pub-
lication bias, pressures for certain results during data collection, and the ability to
strengthen study design prior to data collection. Finally, effective blinding procedures
should continue to be used where possible, during both data collection and during inter-
rater reliability procedures. Where blinding cannot be performed, researchers may wish
to introduce heterogeneity into their study designs–for example by using many different
experimenters, in order to attempt to quantify any experimenter effects.
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Morgan’s canon
Over 70% of our sample somewhat or strongly agreed that Morgan’s canon is important to use
when interpreting the results of animal cognition experiments. Superficially, this contrasts
with a large body of literature criticising the canon on the grounds that there is no reason to
privilege “simpler” or “lower” explanations of animal cognition over more “complicated” or
“higher” explanations [20,21,55–60]. However, participants qualitative responses revealed a
more nuanced picture: Many of those who also provided free-text responses, a) recognised the
inherent ambiguity and multiple interpretations of Morgan’s canon, and, b) cautioned against
a blind application of Morgan’s canon. Of those who defended the canon, most defended a
particular principle associated with it (e.g., parsimony and phylogeny), rather than the canon
itself. Evidently, Morgan’s canon and related concepts elicit a plurality of opinions. Because of
the variety of interpretations and justifications for invoking the canon, or e.g., parsimony,
arguments should not likely be evaluated based on the authority of these principles alone–
because researchers might understand them differently. Rather, researchers should strive to
make the assumptions and justifications for favouring one hypothesis over another explicitly–
something that could be achieved through formal modelling (although, see “Theory and
modelling” section in discussion).
Replication
Over 70% of our sample agreed or strongly agreed that some areas of animal cognition could
experience a replication crisis, and, in our sample, slightly more researchers agreed (44.7%)
than disagreed (38.4%) that their own area of research would experience a replication crisis, if
attempts to replicate its studies were performed. This suggests a large degree of skepticism
about the robustness of research findings in some areas of animal cognition research, or of the
ability of replication studies to repeatedly identify certain effects. However, such skepticism is
common across sciences, with 52% of 1576 researchers surveyed across fields including biol-
ogy, chemistry and physics, reporting that there was a “significant” reproducibility crisis in
their field [61].
In our survey, researchers near unanimously agreed that replications were important, and
not performed frequently enough (Fig 15), mirroring the view of ecology and evolution
researchers [41]. A smaller number of researchers noted that replication studies may be less
important than seeking convergent evidence of phenomena. These views echo wider discus-
sions about the role of direct and conceptual replications in psychology, with conceptual repli-
cations being essential to provide robust evidence of general psychological effects (see e.g.,
[62]). However, an exclusive focus on conceptual replication can be problematic when it co-
exists with a publication bias against negative results (see e.g. [63]), as “converging evidence”
for spurious effects can populate the literature [48]. Hence, if the rate of false discovery is or
has been high in animal cognition research, a short-term focus on direct replication may be
necessary to identify those effects that are locally robust and those that are not (note, however,
that the direct vs conceptual distinction in replications is a false dichotomy, and see [64] and
[65] for perhaps more useful classifications of replication, and [66] and [63] for applications to
animal cognition).
That areas of animal cognition research might experience a replication crisis, combined
with the general belief that replication studies are not performed often enough, is a finding
similar to those in other fields [41,61]. However, unlike many other fields, the possibility for
independent replication is low for most questions in most species. This means that it is critical
for individual labs to assess the likely robustness of their own findings, and these survey data
can provide a starting point for such discussions. In the interim, researchers may wish to be
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cautious when citing and reviewing animal cognition research that they believe shows some
hallmarks of irreproducibility (see [27,67] for discussion of this).
Belief
Researchers reported that their beliefs about animal cognition are influenced by both the
results of scientific experiments and their own personal experience with animals. Typically,
researchers viewed science and experience as synergistic, with experience often cited as the
source of scientific hypotheses, and necessary for designing good experiments. A smaller num-
ber of researchers also endorsed every-day knowledge as a valid source of data that could be
seen as equally strong as some scientific data [68], although researchers often noted that the
role of science and experience depended on the question at hand–there are some, often trivial,
questions that can be answered readily through experience, yet many researchers reported that
some knowledge can only be accessed through systematic scientific study. Finally, researchers
noted that for many species that they have no experience, rely on the scientific literature to
form their beliefs, which requires them to trust the findings of their colleagues.
Miscellaneous
While our survey focused on five blocks of questions that we were particularly interested in,
oftentimes researchers’ free-text responses went beyond these questions and highlighted spe-
cific issues that were not directly solicited by the survey. For example, a researcher offering res-
ervations about the press coverage of animal cognition research, or species biases in what is
tested and interpreted, as well as biases based on the location of where research is conducted.
We encourage the reader to view the full database of open-text responses to make the most use
of these low-frequency data from this survey (osf.io/6j7kp). However, there were five themes
that we interpreted that went beyond our initial survey aims. These were theory, individual-
level research, incentives, heterogeneity and interpreting negative results. Each of these topics
should be key discussion points concerning how animal cognition research should progress,
some which can be applied readily (e.g., focusing on individual-level research), and others that
are longer-term issues (e.g., the role of theory).
Theory and modelling. A lack of theory may impair a field’s progress. Without strong
theoretical grounding, research programmes may fall into a process of testing vague, verbal
hypotheses that are only loosely connected to the data the experimenters collect, and this data
(and the verbal hypothesis) can be interpreted in almost any way the researcher chooses. In
animal cognition, this might result in research programmes that continually use hypothesis
testing within single studies to make large claims, such as e.g., confirming an animal is “clever”
or possess human-like (or any other target animal) abilities [69]. In contrast, formal theories,
be they logical, computational or mathematical, can have a string of benefits. For example,
they might increase the precision and communication of hypotheses, make clear predictions,
and offer the ability to simulate effects (see [70–76] for discussion). In animal cognition
research, evolutionary theory [77], and learning theory [78,79], are two possible sources of
strong theory to ground research programmes in, and tools and tutorials for using theories
like this in study design and analysis are increasingly available [80,81]. However, it is unclear
the extent to which formal models can effectively be generated for all research lines of interest.
This uncertainty can be illustrated on the example of mirror recognition studies. Clearly, how
animals respond to their reflection in a mirror is an interesting question, and one that can be
interpreted in relation to evolutionary and learning theory [82–84]. However, just how much
formal modelling can bring to studies of mirror recognition is unclear. It seems reasonable
that, at first, the primary focus should be on collecting high quality data and discovering robust
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statistical effects, from which theories could be built. For many questions in animal cognition,
especially those where animals are not under a large degree of control, high quality document-
ing and description of behaviour is likely to present a key step in any research programme.
Nevertheless, the role that more formal theory and modelling should play across animal cogni-
tion research is a complicated issue, and one that merits further specific discussion within indi-
vidual research programmes in animal cognition.
Individual level research. Related to the concern about generating high quality data is the
question of what should be the focus of animal cognition research: the individual animal or
the average response of a population of animals? Given that psychological effects, occur within
individual animals, a clear case can be made that researchers should design their experiments,
where possible, with the statistical power to detect meaningful effects within individual ani-
mals [85]. This has the twofold benefit of increasing the reliability of research findings (high
power at the individual level entails high power at the group level), but also of being able to
quantify and describe meaningful individual differences in behaviour [7,86].
Negative results. Throughout the survey, researchers often returned to the issue of nega-
tive results. They both remarked that they are hard to publish due to journals rejecting them,
but also hard to interpret, due to the multiplicity of reasons of why an animal might ‘fail’ a task
or not display a certain effect. This has received previous attention in the animal cognition lit-
erature [87,88], and more widely in psychology [89], but with no clear consensus on the way
forward. For evidence interpreting positive results to be interpreted effectively, the body of
research from which that positive result emerged must be known. In this sense, publishing
negative results is essential for meta-analysis and evidence synthesis. However, individually,
these negative results are undeniably difficult to interpret, and for this reason researchers must
be cautious not to over-interpret the meaning of null results (see e.g., [90]). Similar to mitigat-
ing bias, registered reports and study registration seem promising avenues to mitigate publica-
tion bias and for labs to document which studies they have performed.
Heterogeneity. Across all blocks of our survey, researchers highlighted that their
responses would differ for different researchers and areas of animal cognition research. Ani-
mal cognition research covers a large range of topics, in a large range of species, by a large
range of researchers using many different approaches. Even within individual researchers, it is
likely that some results are more affected by their biases than others, and this makes detecting
bias and quantitative evidence synthesis difficult in animal cognition. In relation to our survey
data, it seems clear that many of our respondents were concerned about several aspects of how
animal cognition research is practiced. However, the extent to which this general concern can
readily be linked to specific studies or areas of the literature is unclear. One possible approach
to address this is to increase the amount of systematic secondary data analysis in meta-research
projects that extract data about the research designs, methods and evidence of published find-
ings in certain research themes [91].
Incentives and improving animal cognition research. Many of the issues highlighted by
our respondents seemed united by the premise that the current academic climate does not
incentivise best scientific practice [92]. This is a well-established theme in the broader scien-
tific literature coming out of the “replication crisis” [93,94], and initiatives already developed
outside of animal cognition research could help researchers respond to the issues highlighted
in this study. As previously mentioned, registered reports and study registration offer a strong
method to combat publication bias. Pre-print servers can also facilitate researchers publishing
data and claims without or prior to peer-review without the possibility of reviewer bias.
However, while individual researchers and laboratories can make some changes to their
research process, the strongest changes will inevitably occur through top-down initiatives. For
example, one survey study found that encouragement from journals, institutions and funders
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would be an effective method of increasing data sharing rates in psychology researchers [95].
Journal policy changes, for example towards accepting replication studies, registered reports,
and embracing more sophisticated standards of evidence evaluating than just statistical signifi-
cance [91], will be key in motivating researchers to produce stronger research reports. How-
ever, ultimately, the degree to which scientific funding and employment structures promote
poor quality science must be examined. Although beyond the scope of this paper, many
researchers have suggested that current grant culture and precarious contracts, coupled with a
strong focus on research output with dubious metrics–such as citation rate and impact factor–
are promoting poor research across scientific fields (e.g. [92–94]). Initiatives to combat these
issues are gaining traction, such as the Declaration on Research Assessment (DORA: https://
sfdora.org/), and, as with any culture shift, there will be a degree of inertia in how fast research
organizations can adapt.
Conclusions
This survey provides a snapshot of animal cognition scientists’ beliefs about bias, replicability
and practices in animal cognition research. Animal cognition scientists predicted replicability
issues in the field and were generally wary of a range of biases affecting the research process,
although more so in others’ work than their own. On average, they believed questionable
research practices and overclaiming to be somewhat prevalent in the research field. The survey
provided direct evidence for a publication bias affecting the field: researchers self-reported
publishing a median of 80% of their studies, however, there was a considerable variation in
their responses. Publication bias seemed to be against negative, difficult to interpret or poorly
designed research, and was both reported as self-enforced (i.e., the article was never written or
submitted), and journal enforced. Researchers also perceived a journal- and reviewer-enforced
publication bias against results contra to established theories and reviewers’ preferences. On
the whole, our participants displayed a range of opinions concerning bias and replicability,
largely mirroring the debates of the wider scientific community when considering reliability of
scientific results. These views included advocating for incentive reform and replications, and
improving statistical inference, but also stressing the importance of developing theory and
seeking converging evidence for theories.
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